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TRADEMARK LAW-DETERMINING A LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION-THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK IMPROPERLY DENIES PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DUE TO ITS MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE RELEVANT
STANDARD AND MISAPPLICATION
OF THE POLAROID 1 FACTORS
JOHNSON KUNCHERIA*
F OR MORE than half a century, the name "Pan Am" has been
associated with major strides in the aviation industry.2 Al-
though the original Pan American World Airways, Inc. ("origi-
nal Pan Am") endured financial woes ultimately resulting in
bankruptcy in the early 1990s, the company is still affectionately
remembered as an innovator in the airline industry spanning
advancements in international, transoceanic, and domestic air
travel.' Arguably, as a result of its pervasive pioneering efforts
and its impact on worldwide air travel, the original Pan Am gen-
erated strong goodwill in connection with its name, marks, and
logos.4 Despite the original company's demise, its valuable
trademarks5 were acquired, following a series of transfers and
assignments, by another company operating under the same
name, Pan American World Airways, Inc. ("Pan Am").6
I See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
*J.D. Candidate 2009, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S.E.E. 2005, high honors, the University of Texas at Austin. The author would
like to thank his parents for their continued love and support.
2 Pan American Worldwide Airways, History, http://www.panam.org/new
histl.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
3 Id.; Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 14442(CSH),
2007 WL 2040588, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.July 13, 2007). See also Pan Am, Pan Am Firsts,
http://wvw.panamair.org/OLDSITE/History/firsts.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).
4 See Right 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *1-2.
5 See, e.g., Pan Am air.org, Pan Am History Logos, http://panamair.org/His-
tory/logos.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
6 Right 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *2.
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Recently, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected Pan Am's motion for preliminary injunction in an
action against Flight 001 for trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and trademark dilution with respect to a number
of those trademarks.7 The court erroneously denied Pan Am's
motion for preliminary injunction first by holding that Pan Am
was required to demonstrate that Flight 001 is likely to resume
certain alleged infringing conduct in light of its voluntary cessa-
tion of such activities, and second, in finding that the likelihood
of confusion factors do not indicate a probability that Pan Am is
likely to succeed on the merits of its claims in regard to the re-
maining marks.8 Further, these errors are likely to have serious
implications on how other district courts, both in the Second
Circuit and beyond, evaluate trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and trademark dilution claims.
The incident case arises in the context of Flight 001's business
model.9 In particular, Flight 001 chose to federally register the
mark FLIGHT 001 in order to invoke the memory of the world's
first transcontinental carrier.1" Further, the company operated
retail stores that engaged in the sale of travel products ranging
from luggage to cosmetics, and employed a meridian globe logo
and a light blue and white color combination in connection
with its retail offerings.11 Additionally, Flight 001's website fea-
tured the original Pan Am Globe logo, trade name, and past
advertisements and offered Pan Am merchandise for sale. 2 Af-
ter Pan Am contacted Flight 001, it voluntarily withdrew from
using these marks on its website and also stopped selling Pan
Am merchandise.13
Pan Am subsequently instituted an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia claiming inter
alia, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and dilution
and soon thereafter filed a motion for preliminary injunction, as
is common in trademark cases. 4 With the motion for prelimi-
nary injunction still pending, the case was transferred to the
7 Id. at *20.
8 See id. at *6, *19-20.
9 Id. at *3-4.
10 Id. at *3.
11 Id.
12 Id. at *4.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.15 After finding that Pan Am's marks were valid and war-
ranted trademark protection, the court denied Pan Am's mo-
tion for preliminary injunction.16 In particular, the district
court held that Pan Am failed to show that resumption of the
alleged infringing activities that Flight 001 had since voluntary
ceased was likely, and that the factors established in Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp. did not demonstrate a likelihood
that Pan Am would successfully establish a likelihood of confu-
sion as to the remaining marks.1"
A party who seeks a preliminary injunction is required to show
a "probability of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive
relief and either a likelihood that it will succeed on the merits of
its claim, or a serious question going to the merits and a balance
of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor."1 " Notably, however,
in a trademark infringement or an unfair competition action,
establishing a likelihood of confusion for a mark that deserves
trademark protection, in turn, establishes both irreparable
harm and a likelihood of success on the merits requirements.19
Although the First Circuit has demanded that a movant must
additionally demonstrate that resumption of alleged infringing
conduct is likely, where the alleged infringer has voluntarily
ceased such activity, to invoke the remedy of preliminary injunc-
tion,2" a number of district courts in the Second Circuit have
ruled that an alleged infringer's termination of contested con-
duct does not alter the preliminary injunction analysis at all, for
a movant "is not required to rest upon [alleged infringer's] as-
surances that it will not in the future [resume the contested
activity] ."21
Establishing trademark infringement or unfair competition
requires a showing that (1) the "mark merits protection" and
(2) "the [alleged infringer's] use of a similar mark is likely to
cause consumer confusion [as to the origin, sponsorship, or af-
15 Id.
16 Id. at *11, *20.
17 Id. at *6, *12, *19-20 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
1s Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
19 Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2004).
20 Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. v.Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1997).
21 See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 186 F.
Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp. 697, 701 (D. Conn. 1970).
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filiation of the goods at issue]."22 In determining whether a
mark merits protection, federally registered trademarks are pre-
sumed to merit protection while unregistered marks warrant
protection only if they are "sufficiently 'distinctive"' in avoiding
consumer confusion by distinguishing the source of relevant
goods.23 Distinctiveness either can be inherently established by
the intrinsic quality of the mark or can be acquired through
"secondary meaning" created in the minds of the consuming
public between the source of the goods and the goods
themselves.24
The Second Circuit has established that determining a likeli-
hood of confusion demands an evaluation of eight non-exclu-
sive factors collectively known as the Polaroid factors which are:
(1) the strength of the mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the two marks;
(3) the competitive proximity of the products;
(4) actual confusion;
(5) the likelihood the plaintiff will bridge the gap;
(6) the defendant's good faith in adopting its mark;
(7) the quality of the defendant's products; and
(8) the sophistication of the purchasers. 25
Notably, none of these factors are dispositive on the issue of
trademark infringement, nor are these factors to be mechani-
cally tallied to determine a winning side.26 Rather, the Polaroid
factors are merely instructive in answering the critical question
of whether the consuming public is likely to be confused.27 The
factors of particular relevance to this discussion are (2) and (6).
While the degree of similarity between two marks is determined
by an evaluation of all factors that could create consumer confu-
sion within the limited context in which the marks themselves
are found,28 the factor addressing the good faith intent of the
defendant questions the motivation of the second user in using
the contested marks, asking specifically whether there was an
22 Brennan's Inc., 360 F.3d at 128-30 (citations omitted).
23 Star Indus. Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005).
24 See id.
25 Brennan's, Inc., 360 F.3d at 130 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
26 See Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986).
27 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., 799 F.2d at 872.
28 See Star Indus., Inc., 412 F.3d at 386.
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intentional effort to create confusion between the two marks.29
Notably, however, mere former knowledge of the first user's
mark does not warrant an inference of bad faith.3
In denying the motion for preliminary injunction, the court
first excluded the Pan Am trade name, word mark, and globe
logo from the purview of the preliminary injunction evalua-
tion." Specifically, the court found that given Flight 001's vol-
untary cessation of alleged infringing use, Pan Am failed to
demonstrate that Flight 001 was nevertheless likely to resume
such activities.32 Although district courts in the Second Circuit,
including the Southern District of New York itself, have con-
cluded that preliminary injunctions may still be granted despite
voluntary cessation of alleged infringing activities, the court
departed from this reasoning in favor of the approach of the
First Circuit as embodied in Johnson-Powell, which demanded a
likelihood of resumption of such activities as a prerequisite to an
award of preliminary injunction.34 Second, the court found that
Pan Am's marks warranted protection under trademark law be-
cause the Pan Am Globe logo was federally registered and that
use of its blue and white color scheme in connection with its
trade name, mark, and logo would likely be eligible for trade
dress protection.35
Next, although Pan Am had demonstrated "serious questions
going to the merits" of the case, the district court held that it
nevertheless fell short of demonstrating a likelihood of success
as assessed under the Polaroid factors.36 The court found that
the Pan Am Globe logo and the blue and white color scheme
had acquired distinctiveness and further found that the goods
were in competitive proximity, at least in the context of the re-
tail sale of travel goods.3 7 It also found that there was no evi-
29 See id. at 388.
30 Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2004).
31 Pan Am. Worldwide Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., No. 06 Civ.
14442(CSH), 2007 WL 2040588, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007).
32 Id.
33 See Mercury Record Corp. v. Buckingham Record Co., 226 F. Supp, 427, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,
186 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp. 697, 701 (D. Conn.
1970).
34 See Flight 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *6; Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurol-
ogy, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d. 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
35 See Flight 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *11.
36 Id. at *17.
37 Id. at *11, *14.
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dence of actual confusion,38 but ruled that Pan Am was
nevertheless likely to "bridge the gap"39 and expand into Flight
001's retail market in the future. 40 Additionally, the district
court ruled that due to lack of evidence by either party on the
respective issues, the quality of the product and consumer so-
phistication factors stood neutral, weighing in favor of neither
party.4' Interestingly, however, the court held that the Pan Am
Globe logo and the Flight 001 Globe logo were not similar
enough to lead to consumer confusion focusing on the "eight
stylized latitudinal lines and a single longitudinal line" in the
former and the "five latitudinal lines and six longitudinal lines"
in the latter.4 2 In an attempt to bolster its reasoning, it argued
that the Pan Am Globe logo was frequently displayed indepen-
dent of other symbols whereas the Flight 001 Globe logo had
been used alongside other symbols.43 Additionally, even though
the court conceded that Flight 001 used a light blue and white
color combination that was "highly similar" to Pan Am's color
scheme, it nevertheless ruled that the use of the two were not
similar enough to warrant finding the similarity factor in Pan
Am's favor.44 The court argued that the color combinations had
been used in different contexts: Flight 001 had used its color
scheme on wood paneling, while Pan Am's logos stood indepen-
dent of any other symbols, and the Pan Am trade dress typically
featured a display of the PAN AM word mark.4 5 Further, despite
the court finding that Flight 001 intended to "draw upon [the]
nostalgia associated with the original Pan Am's style and history"
relying squarely on Flight 001's own admissions, the district
court nonetheless found an absence of bad faith, reasoning that
it was not evident that Flight 001 intended to create consumer
confusion.46
The holdings of this case present serious implications for
trademark infringement actions in the Second Circuit. As dis-
38 Id. at *15.
39 Star Indus. Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 387 (2d Cir. 2005) (describ-
ing the 'bridging the gap' factor as the "likelihood that the senior user will enter
the junior user's market in the future, or that consumers will perceive the senior
user as likely to do so").
40 Flight 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *15.
4" Id. at *16.




46 Id. at *16.
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cussed above, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York chose to depart from other district courts in
the Second Circuit, including its own precedent,47 and followed
instead the approach adopted by the First Circuit4" in deciding
that voluntary cessation of contested activity by an alleged in-
fringer induces an additional burden on the claimant to show
evidence of a likelihood of resumption of such activities.49 Be-
yond insisting that a preliminary injunction is an "'extraordi-
nary equitable remedy'- 50 to be awarded only upon a showing of
a "'probability of irreparable harm in the absence of irreparable
harm,' '' 51 the court failed to adequately rationalize its depar-
ture. Even more perplexing is that even though the court con-
ceded that the relevant standard for preliminary injunction in
trademark actions teaches that evidence of likelihood of confu-
sion in turn establishes both likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable harm,52 the court nevertheless demanded an ex-
tra layer of evidence-that is, evidence of a likelihood of resump-
tion of the alleged infringing conduct. 53
Moreover, the court took on a much more rigid approach in
determining a likelihood of confusion, specifically in addressing
the factors of degree of similarity between the marks and defen-
dant's good faith. Flight 001's counsel admitted that media re-
ports had taken the connection between Flight 001's name and
Pan Am's legendary flight out of context when used in conjunc-
tion with the sale of travel goods bearing the Pan Am logo, but
notably such statements in the media have served as evidence of
the public's understanding of a term at issue.54 Therefore, not
only does this apparent confusion serve as evidence of actual
confusion, it also reinforces the contention that the two marks
47 See Mercury Record Corp. v. Buckingham Record Co., 226 F. Supp. 427, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,
186 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
48 See Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1997).
49 See Flight 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *6.
50 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 277
F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2002)).
5' Id. (quoting Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141,145 (2d Cir. 2003)).
52 See id. at *5 (citing Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125,
129 (2d Cir. 2004)).
53 See id. at *6.
54 Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *1, Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 14442 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007), 2007
WL 1991855.
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are at least similar enough to be mistaken as being from a com-
mon source. Additionally, although the court argued that Flight
001's mere knowledge of Pan Am's marks were not sufficient to
argue bad faith, it failed to give fair deference to the admission
by one of the founders of Flight 001 that the name itself was
chosen specifically to invoke the "nostalgia associated with the
original Pan Am's style and history. ' 55 In light of these facts
showing sufficient similarity and bad faith, the court should
have ruled that there was a likelihood of success and imposed a
preliminary injunction as a necessary remedy.
Therefore, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York misconstrued the relevant standard for pre-
liminary injunction by demanding that Pan Am show a likeli-
hood of resumption of the alleged infringing activities, and
misevaluated the Polaroid factors by not fairly assessing the simi-
larity of the marks and the absence of defendant's good faith.
Not only does this precedent skew the preliminary injunction
standards in the Second Circuit, but it also gives future infring-
ers much more freedom in conducting their activities. Particu-
larly, they may continue infringing conduct as long as they cease
such activities under the cloak of good faith, leaving a claimant
with the final burden to show likelihood of resumption. Addi-
tionally, imitations of an existing mark may now be readily made
by minor modifications and altered positioning to adjoining
symbols. Furthermore, demonstrating bad faith has been ren-
dered nearly impossible except perhaps in cases where there are
explicit statements or other representations to that effect. Thus,
this rigid approach is patently unfair to the victim of trademark
infringement and should instead be replaced wholesale by a
flexible one which takes into account all facts leading to con-
sumer confusion and the proper standard for preliminary
injunction.
55 Hight 001, Inc., 2007 WL 2040588, at *15.
